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German strategy was influenced by pre-war theories on strategic bombing, such as those espoused by Giulio Douhet. This stressed the air assault, the weakness of air defence, and the effects of terror bombing on public morale. After the Spanish Civil War the emphasis of German air operations had shifted toward a more tactical force. In Poland and France, the Luftwaffe had operated jointly with the Army, creating the Blitzkrieg or "lightning war". However, in the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe had to operate alone, not as support for an advancing Army but as a decisive weapon in its own right. There remained a strong belief in the power of strategic bombing and the battle was seen by Göring as an opportunity to prove what his air force could do.
The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on Britain's southern and northern flanks. Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. Luftflotte 3, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle was responsible for the West Country, Midlands and northwest England. Luftflotte 5, commanded by Generaloberst Hans-Jurgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, had responsibility for the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night Blitz while the main attack fell upon Luftflotte 2's shoulders. Late in the battle an Italian expeditionary force, the Corpo Aereo Italiano, briefly joined the fighting.
Initial Luftwaffe estimates of the duration of the campaign was for four days to defeat the RAF's Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks in which bombers and long-range fighters would mop up the rest of the country and destroy Britain's aircraft industry. The plan was to begin attacks on airfields near to the coast, gradually rolling subsequent attacks inland toward London and the ring of Sector airfields defending it. Broadly, the Luftwaffe kept to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Hugo Sperrle, wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing. His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Albert Kesselring, demanded to attack London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or draw RAF fighters up into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to clarify strategy between his commanders, obsessed as he was with maintaining his own powerbase in the Luftwaffe and indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.
The Luftwaffe was ill-served by their lack of intelligence on the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured, riven by rivalries and their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940 there were few or no German agents operating in Britain and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant that the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences: in particular of the crucial command and control system that had been built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as 5th Abteilung's November 1939 assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it didn't match received wisdom. For much of the battle the Luftwaffe operated 'blind', unaware of their enemy's true strengths, capabilities and deployments. Many times the leadership believed Fighter Command strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence installations. The results of bombing and air fighting were exaggerated, resulting in a Luftwaffe leadership that became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant that the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall.
The Battle of Britain campaign made the eight-gun monoplane fighters of the RAF—the Spitfire and Hurricane—into legends. However, the keystone of the British defence was the complex machinery of detection, command and control that ran the battle. This was known as the 'Dowding System' after its chief architect: Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command.
Dowding's system began with early warning detection of incoming raids by radar. Radar stations codenamed Chain Home lined the coast, watching enemy raids form up over France and warning when they began to move. Raiders that penetrated the radar chain were picked up by the Observer Corps which would track the raids visually from a network of ground posts. Reports from radar and observers were passed back to 'filtering stations' that sorted and organised the information. This was then passed on to the Fighter Command headquarters at Stanmore and the HQ of each fighter Group. The information would appear on plotting tables: large maps on which counters marking the incoming raids would be moved. RAF officers known as Fighter Controllers could then order a response from their front-line squadrons.
It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher, used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of Britain's command a view of German intentions but it seems that little of this material filtered down to Hugh Dowding's desk. However, the 'Y' radio listening service, monitoring the patterns of Luftwaffe radio traffic, contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.
Britain's airspace was divided up into Groups. 10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Quintin Brand . 11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical approaches to London and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park. 12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Finally, 13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul .
The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors, each commanding between two and four squadrons. Sector stations, comprising an aerodrome with a command post, were the heart of this organisation, though they also had satellite airfields to disperse squadrons to. Group HQs would pass filtered information down to the sector stations and instruct them to 'scramble' their squadrons into the air. Once airborne, the squadrons would be commanded by radio-telephone (R/T) from their sector station. Squadrons could be ordered to patrol airfields or vital targets, or be 'vectored' to intercept incoming raids.
Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at that time, the Dowding System had many limitations. The RDF radar was subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T communications with airborne fighters were restricted because of the RAF's use of High-Frequency (HF) radio sets. HF radio was limited in range and even with a network of relay stations the squadrons could not roam more than one or two sectors from their airfield. It was also restricted to a single frequency per squadron, making it impossible to communicate between squadrons. Finally, the system for tracking RAF fighters, known as HF/DF or "Huff-Duff", restricted sectors to a maximum of four squadrons in the air.
In spite of this RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range and provided multiple channels. For all its faults the RAF had a system of ground control that allowed their fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.
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