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1.2 Open Question Argument

Moore began his ethics by proposing exactly what "good" is not. He did this by forming the Open Question Argument, showing that the assumed definition of "good" is incorrect due to an inability to localize "good". We begin by using one of the most common definitions of "good" (that being "good" is that which is desirable), then we proceed with the following line of argumentation: If we assert that "X is good", we are really asserting that X is desirable. In doing so, we must then ask "Is it good to desire X?" Thus leading to "Is it good for us to desire to desire X?" As it is plain to see, Moore's point is that by assuming "good" to be equal with another property leads to a line of questioning that never ends. The argument could also be structured as such:

  1. "X is good" = "X has property P"
  2. X has P, but is X good? (are things that have P good?)
  3. X has P, but does it have P? (do things that have P have P?)

Ultimately, all you end up with is an infinite number of Xes being desirable for being desirable for being desirable ad infinitum...Therefore, "good" has to be its own property, separate from all others, "good" cannnot equal that which we desire (or "happiness", or "pleasure").

1.3 Good as indefinable

Moore contended that goodness cannot be associated with any other property. In his book the Principia Ethica , he stated it as such:

It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not ?other,? but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness.(Moore, 318)

Therefore, the only definition we can give of "good" is an ostensive one; that is, we can only point to an action or a thing and say "That is good." Similarly, we cannot describe to a blind man exactly what yellow is. We can only show a sighted man a piece of yellow paper or a yellow scrap of cloth and say "That is yellow."

1.4 Good as a non-natural property

In addition to categorizing "good" as indefinable, Moore also emphasized that it is a non-natural property. That is, two objects that are qualitatively identical cannot have different values. There cannot be two yellow shirts that are identical in every way (same shade of yellow, made at the same factory, the same brand name, the same style, etc...) except for their reception of the predication of "good" (one cannot be good and the other not good). An object's property of "good" is determined by what other properties the object has. It is a property that is a product of having other properties. Therefore, if two objects are qualitatively identical, they must have the same value of "good".

1.5 Moral Knowledge

To support his proposed arguments, Moore contended that man has a "moral intuition" that helps him locate what exactly is "good". In this he was a follower of Ethical intuitionism.

2 Language

He also first drew attention to what is now called " Moore's Paradox", the peculiar inconsistency involved in uttering a sentence like "It is raining but I don't believe that it is." This puzzle inspired a great deal of work by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

3 External links

4 Books

5 Sources

  1. G.E. Moore, On Defining "Good," in Analytic Philosophy: Classic Readings, Stamford, CT: Wadsworth, 2002, pp.1-10. BooksEnthsiast.com.
Moore, G.E. Moore, G.E. Moore, G.E. Moore, G.E.



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