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On hearing of the king's determination to summon the States-General, Mirabeau started for Provence, and offered to assist at the preliminary conference of the noblesse of his district. They rejected him; he appealed to the tiers état, and was returned both for Aix and for Marseille. He elected to sit for the former city, and was present at the opening of the states-general on May 4, 1789. From this time the record of Mirabeau's life forms the best history of the first two years of the Constituent Assembly, for at every important crisis his voice is to be heard, though his advice was not always followed. He possessed at the same time great logical acuteness and the most passionate enthusiasm. From the beginning he recognized that government exists in order that the bulk of the population may pursue their daily work in peace and quiet, and that for a government to be successful it must be strong.
At the same time he thoroughly comprehended that for a government to be strong it must be in harmony with the wishes of the majority of the people. He had carefully studied the English constitution in England, and he hoped to establish in France a system similar in principle but without any slavish imitation of the details of the English constitution. In the first stage of the history of the States-General Mirabeau's part was very great. He was soon recognized as a leader, to the chagrin of Jean Joseph Mounier, because he always knew his own mind, and was prompt in emergencies. To him is to be attributed the successful consolidation of the National Assembly.
When the storming of the Bastille had assured the success of the French Revolution, he warned the Assembly of the futility of passing fine-sounding decrees and urged the necessity for acting. He declared that the famous night of August 4 was but an orgy, giving the people an immense theoretical liberty while not assisting them to practical freedom, and overthrowing the old régime before a new one could be constituted. His failure to control the theorizers showed Mirabeau, after the removal of the king and the Assembly to Paris, that his eloquence would not enable him to guide the Assembly by himself, and that he must therefore try to get some support. He wished to establish a strong ministry, which should be responsible like an English ministry, but to an assembly chosen to represent the people of France better than the English House of Commons at that time represented England.
He first thought of becoming a minister at a very early date, if we may believe a story contained in the Mémoires of the duchesse d'Abrantes, to the effect that in May 1789 Queen Marie Antoinette tried to bribe him, but that he refused this and expressed his wish to be a minister. The indignation with which the queen repelled the idea may have made him think of the Louis Philippe Joseph, duc d'Orléans as a possible constitutional king, because his title would of necessity be parliamentary. But the weakness of Orleans was too palpable, and in a famous remark Mirabeau expressed his utter contempt for him. He also attempted to form an alliance with Lafayette, but the general was as vain and as obstinate as Mirabeau himself, and had his own theories about a new French constitution. Mirabeau tried for a time, too, to act with Necker, and obtained the sanction of the Assembly to Necker's financial scheme, not because it was good, but because, as he said, "no other plan was before them, and something must be done."
The Comte de la Marck was a Flemish nobleman, a close friend of the queen, and had been elected a member of the states-general. His acquaintance with Mirabeau, begun in 1788, ripened during the following year into a friendship, which La Marck hoped to turn to the advantage of the court. After the events of the 5th and 6th of October he consulted Mirabeau as to what measures the king ought to take, and Mirabeau, delighted at the opportunity, drew up an admirable state paper, which was presented to the king by Monsieur, afterwards Louis XVIII. The whole of this Mémoire should be read to get an adequate idea of Mirabeau's genius for politics; here it must be summarized.
The main position is that the king is not free in Paris; he must therefore leave Paris towards the interior of France to a provincial capital, best of all to Rouen, and there he must appeal to the people and summon a great convention. It would be ruin to appeal to the noblesse, as the queen advised.
When this great convention met the king must show himself ready to recognize that great changes have taken place, that feudalism and absolutism have for ever disappeared, and that a new relation between king and people has arisen, which must be loyally observed on both sides for the future. To establish this new constitutional position between king and people would not be difficult, because the indivisibility of the monarch and his people is an anchored in the heart of the French people.
Such was Mirabeau's programme, from which he never diverged, but which was far too statesmanlike to be understood by the poor king, and far too positive regarding the altered condition of the monarchy to be palatable to the queen. Mirabeau followed up his Mémoire by a scheme of a great ministry to contain all men of mark; Necker as prime minister, "to render him as powerless as he is incapable, and yet preserve his popularity for the king," the duc de Liancourt, the duc de La Rochefoucauld, La Marck, Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, at the finances, Mirabeau without portfolio, GJB Target, mayor of Paris, Lafayette generalissimo to reform the army, Louis Philippe, comte de Ségur (foreign affairs), Mounier and IRG le Chapelier.
This scheme got noised abroad, and was ruined by a decree of the Assembly of November 7 1789, that no member of the Assembly could become a minister; this decree destroyed any chance of that necessary harmony between the ministry and the majority of the representatives of the nation which existed in England, and so at once overthrew Mirabeau's hopes. The queen utterly refused to take Mirabeau's counsel, and La Marck left Paris. However, in April 1790 he was suddenly recalled by the comte de Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, and the queen's most trusted political adviser, and from this time to Mirabeau's death he became the medium of almost daily communications between the latter and the queen. Mirabeau at first attempted again to make an alliance with Lafayette, but it was useless, for Lafayette was not a strong man himself and did not appreciate "la force" in others. From the month of May 1790 to his death in April 1791 Mirabeau remained in close connection with the court, and drew up many admirable state papers for it. In return the court paid his debts; but it ought never to be said that he was bribed, for the gold of the court never made him swerve from his political principles; never, for instance, made him a royalist. He regarded himself as a minister, though an unavowed one, and believed himself worthy of his hire.
On the great question of the veto he took a practical view, and seeing that the royal power was already sufficiently weakened, declared for the king's absolute veto and against the compromise of the suspensive veto. He knew from his English experiences that such a veto would be hardly ever used unless the king felt the people were on his side, and that if it were used unjustifiably the power of the purse possessed by the representatives of the people would bring about a bloodless revolution, as in England in 1688. He saw also that much of the inefficiency of the Assembly arose from the inexperience of the members and their incurable verbosity; so, to establish some system of rules, he got his friend Romilly to draw up a detailed account of the rules and customs of the English House of Commons, which he translated into French, but which the Assembly, puffed up by a belief in its own merits, refused to use. On the great subject of peace and war he supported the king's authority, and with some success. Again Mirabeau almost alone of the Assembly held that the soldier ceased to be a citizen when he became a soldier; he must submit to be deprived of his liberty to think and act, and must recognize that a soldier's first duty is obedience. With such sentiments, it is no wonder that he approved of the vigorous conduct of Francois Claude Amour, marquis de Bouillé, at Nancy, which was the more to his credit as Bouillé was the one hope of the court influences opposed to him. Lastly, in matters of finance he showed his wisdom: he attacked Necker's "caisse d'escompte," which was to have the whole control of the taxes, as absorbing the Assembly's power of the purse; and he heartily approved of the system of assignats, but with the reservation that they should not be issued to the extent of more than one-half the value of the lands to be sold.
Of Mirabeau's attitude with regard to foreign affairs it is necessary to speak in more detail. He held it to be just that the French people should conduct their Revolution as they would, and that no foreign nation had any right to interfere with them while they kept themselves strictly to their own affairs. But he knew also that neighbouring nations looked with unquiet eyes on the progress of affairs in France, that they feared the influence of the Revolution on their own peoples, and that foreign monarchs were being prayed by the French emigres to interfere on behalf of the French monarchy. To prevent this interference, or rather to give no pretext for it, was his guiding thought as to foreign policy. He had been elected a member of the comité diplomatique of the Assembly in July 1790, and became its reporter at once, and in this capacity he was able to prevent the Assembly from doing much harm in regard to foreign affairs. He had long known Armand Marc, comte de Montmorin, the foreign secretary, and, as matters became more strained from the complications with the princes and counts of the empire, he entered into daily communication with the minister, advised him on every point, and, while dictating his policy, defended it in the Assembly. Mirabeau's exertions in this respect are not his smallest title to the name of statesman; and how great a work he did is best proved by the confusion which ensued in this department after his death.
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