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Meanwhile in Germany, Hans Eric Hollmann had been working for some time in the field of microwaves, which were to later become the basis of almost all radar systems. In 1935 he published Physics and Technique of Ultrashort Waves, which was then picked up by researchers around the world. At the time he had been most interested in their use for communications, but he and his partner Hans-Karl von Willisen had also worked on radar-like systems.
In the autumn of 1934 their company, GEMA, built the first commercial radar system for detecting ships. Operating in the 50 cm range it could detect ships up to 10 km away, similar in purpose to Huelsmeyer's earlier device. In the summer of 1935 a pulse radar was developed with which they could spot the ship the Königsberg 8 km away, with an accuracy of up to 50 m, enough for gun-laying. The same system could also detect an aircraft at 500 m altitude at a distance of 28 km. The military implications were not lost this time around, and construction of land and sea-based versions took place as Freya and Seetakt.
At this point both the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany knew of each other's ongoing efforts in their arms race. Both nations were intensely interested in the other's developments in the field, and engaged in an active campaign of espionage and false leaks about their respective equipment. But it was only in Britain that the usefulness of the system became obvious, so while the German systems had the edge technologically (operating on much shorter wavelengths) only Britain started true mass deployment of both the radars and the control systems needed to support them.
see also: H2S radar,
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II several radar stations known as Chain Home (or CH) were constructed in the south of England. As one might expect from the first radar to be deployed, CH was a simple system. The broadcast side was formed from two 300' (100 m) tall steel towers strung with a series of cables between them. The output of a powerful 50 MHz radio of about 200 kW (up to 800 kW in later models) was fed into these cables, pulsed at about 50 times a second. A second set of 240' (73 m) tall wooden towers were used for reception, with a series of crossed antennas at various heights up to 215' (65 m). Most stations had more than one set of each antenna, tuned to operate at different frequencies.
The CH radar was read with an oscilloscope. When a pulse was sent out into the broadcast towers, the scope was triggered to start its beam moving horizontally across the screen very rapidly. The output from the receiver was amplified and fed into the vertical axis of the scope, so a return from an aircraft would deflect the beam upward. This formed a spike on the display, and the distance from the left side - measured with a small scale on the bottom of the screen - would give the distance to the target. By rotating the receiver antennas to make the display disappear, the operator could determine the direction (this is the reason for the cross shaped antennas), the size of the vertical displacement indicated something of the number of aircraft involved, and by comparing the strengths returned from the various antennas up the tower, the altitude could be determined.
CH proved highly effective during the Battle of Britain, and is often credited with allowing the RAF to defeat the much larger Luftwaffe forces. Whereas the Luftwaffe had to hunt all over to find the RAF fighters, the RAF knew exactly where the Luftwaffe bombers were, and could converge all of their fighters on them. The RDF stations only worked over the sea, and the positions of enemy aircraft over land had to be relayed by observers and aircraft.
Very early in the battle the Luftwaffe made a series of small raids on a few of the stations, but they were returned to operation in a few days. In the meantime the operators took to broadcasting radar-like signals from other systems in order to fool the Germans into believing that the systems were still operating. Eventually the Germans gave up trying to bomb them. The Luftwaffe apparently never understood the importance of radar to the RAF's efforts, or they would have assigned them a much higher priority -- it is clear they could have knocked them out continually if they wished.
In order to avoid the CH system the Luftwaffe adopted other tactics. One was to approach Britain at very low levels, below the sight line of the radar stations. This was countered to some degree with a series of shorter range stations built right on the coast, known as Chain Home Low (CHL). These radars had originally been intended to use for naval gun-laying and known as Coastal Defense (CD), but their narrow beams also meant they could sweep an area much closer to the ground without seeing the reflection of the ground (or water) itself. Unlike the larger CH systems, CHL had to have the broadcast antenna itself turned, as opposed to just the receiver. This was done manually on a pedal-crank system run by WAAFs until more reliable motorized movements were installed in 1941.