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In his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in three different ways:
In Kant's view immorality occurs when the categorical imperative is not followed: when a person attempts to set a different standard for themselves than for the rest of humanity. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, once Kant has derived his categorical imperative he applies it to a number of examples. The second example and probably the most analysed is that of an unfaithful promise. Kant applies his imperative to a person who is short of money who intends to ask for a loan, promising to repay it, but with no intention of doing so. When Kant applies the categorical imperative to this situation he discovers that it leads to a contradiction, for if breaking promises were to become universal then no person would ever agree to a promise and promises would disappear. Kant connects rationality with morality, and sees contradictory behaviour as immoral. Some critics have argued that Kant never asserts the connection between rationality and morality, but most dismiss this and point out that Kant clearly explains how morality must be based upon reason and not upon desires.
Especially important to Kant were the works of Aristotle, which stand in direct opposition to much of what Kant argues. Before Kant the most important moral theories were based upon Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics which assert that whatever leads to greater eudaimonia, or happiness, is what is moral. Kant, however, believes that any action taken for a deliberate end, whether it be happiness or some other goal, is morally neutral. Kant rests his rejection of the Aristotelian position on a number of points. He points out that all the imperatives are hypothetical, they are performed merely to attain a certain end. More importantly to Kant, this end is one dictated by desires, implying that the human will is no more than a facilitator of predetermined ends, limiting human freedom.
Kant also challenges the traditional viewpoint using his definition of duty as something that is impossible to learn from observation, and thus can only be deduced rationally. While it is possible to learn imperatives of skill and prudence that are morally neutral through observation, the categorical imperative that allows one to determine what actually is moral is known a priori and can only be properly determined through reason. Any imperative that is hypothetical is not based on reason. You perform a hypothetical imperative only if you want or desire something; they are performed for a certain hoped for end. They are based on desire and hope and not upon the reason upon which ethics should be founded.
One problem is how Kant can possibly regard the first two formulas as equivalent. The answer may lie in the fundamental motivation for the Categorical Imperative—it is essentially based on a conception of fairness and universalizability. I must realise that there must be a consistent law for everyone—there cannot be one rule for me and another for everyone else.
For example, stealing would fail the test, since, to steal, you must deny the existence of property rights. But in so doing, you would be denying ownership of your own property, and the whole act of stealing would become (in Kant's eyes) logically self-defeating.
This desire for consistency drives the first formulation - could I consistently will that stealing became a universal law? Of course not. The same goes for killing, lying, and so on - I cannot will that these be universally practiced, since if they were it would be harmful to me. Any such actions I carry out are thus inconsistent with reason. There are also more subtle effects: for example, I cannot decide never to help others out, as I must recognise that I am likely to need help from others at some point.
The second formulation can be seen as following from the first - if we are tempted to use other people merely as a means, we must realise that a universal law that allowed this would harm us. So the second formulation can be seen as just an example of a universal law willed under the first formulation.
More than this, however, the second formulation is again based on a concept of fairness - although I recognise the importance of myself as an end (that is, a person with hopes, desires, and so on), I must realise that what is special about me as a rational being also makes everyone else special, and they too must be seen as ends-in-themselves. So I must regard all persons as ends-in-themselves, rather than just as means to my ends, which are, after all, no more important than anyone else's.
Thus, the first two formulations (and therefore the third, which combines the two) can arguably be seen as closely tied together.
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