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First-order predicate calculus or first-order logic (FOL) is a theory in symbolic logic that permits the formulation of quantified statements such as "there is at least one X such that..." or "for any X, it is the case that...", where X is an element of a set called the domain of discourse. A first-order theory is a theory that can be axiomatised as an extension of first-order logic by adding a recursive set of first-order sentences as axioms.
First-order logic is distinguished from higher-order logic in that it does not allow statements such as "for every property, it is the case that..." or "there exists a set of objects such that..."
Nevertheless, first-order logic is strong enough to formalize all of set theory and thereby virtually all of mathematics. Its restriction to quantification over individuals makes it difficult to use for the purposes of topology, but it is the classical logical theory underlying mathematics. It is a stronger theory than sentential logic, but a weaker theory than arithmetic, set theory, or Second-order logic.
Like any logical theory, the calculus of first-order logic consists of
There are two types of axioms: the logical axioms which embody the general truths about proper reasoning involving quantified statements, and the axioms describing the subject matter at hand, for instance axioms describing sets in set theory or axioms describing numbers in arithmetic.
While the set of inference rules in first-order calculus is finite, the set of axioms may very well be and often is infinite. However we require that there is a general algorithm which can decide for a given well-formed formula whether it is an axiom or not. Furthermore, there should be an algorithm which can decide whether a given application of an inference rule is correct or not.
The well-formed formulas contain:
Note that only , , and are needed for a complete set of logical connectives.
The object, predicate and function constants will typically depend on the particular domain we are talking about.
Instead of giving the lengthy definition of well-formed formulas, we will simply look at some examples from arithmetic together with their ordinary interpretation. Our domain here is the set of natural numberNatural number can mean either a positive integer ( 1, 2, 3, 4,. or a non-negative integer ( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,. Natural numbers have two main purposes: they can be used for counting ("there are 3 apples on the table"), or they can be used for ordering ("thiss:
For every number x there exists a bigger number y. That's true.
There exists a number y which is bigger than every number x. That's not true.
If a number x is divisible by 6, then it is also divisible by 3. True.
There exists a number x such that there doesn't exist a smaller number y. True (take x=0).
Now one would have to write down 15 logical axioms and 2 inference rules to completely specify the first-order calculus. How can one be sure that those axioms and rules are enough? This is the subject of Gödel's completeness theoremModel theory Godel's completeness theorem is a fundamental theorem in mathematical logic proved by Kurt Godel in 1929. It states, in its most familiar form, that in first-order predicate calculus every universally valid formula can be proved. The word "pr: if you start out with some subject matter axioms and you look at a certain statement, then it is possible to prove that statement using only the subject matter axioms, the 15 logical axioms and the two inference rules if and only if the statement is true in every domain in which the subject matter axioms are true. (See also Leon HenkinLeon Henkin is a logician, currently Emeritus Professor at Berkeley. He is principally known for the "Henkin Completeness Proof": his version of the proof of the semantic completeness of standard systems of first-order logic. Henkin's result was not novel)