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In philosophy, ethics is commonly divided into two branches, normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics addresses questions such as "What actions are good and bad?" and "What should we do?" Thus, a theory of normative ethics will endorse some ethical evaluations. Meta-ethics, on the other hand, seeks to understand the nature of ethical evaluations. Thus, examples of meta-ethical questions include:- What does it mean to say something is "good"?
- How, if at all, do we know what is right and wrong?
- How do moral attitudes motivate action?
- Are there objective values? {In this connection, see Science of Value}.
A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not contain any ethical evaluations (notice that an answer to any of the above four questions would not itself be an ethical statement).
In the last century, the field of meta-ethics has been dominated by many kinds of theories:
- Ethical realism which holds that an objective morality exists. It is further generally divided under two subgroups:
- Ethical intuitionism or ethical non-naturalism, which holds that there are objective, irreducible moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have intuitive awareness of moral properties or of moral truths.
- Ethical naturalism, which holds that there are objective moral properties, but that these properties are reducible to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral truths. Several have argued that moral knowledge can be gained by the same means as scientific knowledge.
- Ethical consensus theory which holds that an absolute moral can be accomplished through an idealized moral discourse. Jurgen Habermas is one of the followers of this view.
- Ethical subjectivism, which holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of observers. An example of this is the view that for a thing to be morally right is just for it to be approved of by society; this leads to the view that different things are right in different societies.
- Non-cognitivism, which holds that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not assert genuine propositions. Some have held that ethical sentences such as "Stealing is wrong" are merely expressions of emotion; others have argued that they are more like imperatives.
- Moral skepticism, which holds that ethical sentences are generally false. Moral skeptics hold that there are no objective values, but that the claim that there are objective values is part of the meaning of ordinary ethical sentences; that is why, in their view, ethical sentences are false.
The first three positions can be grouped together under the heading moral realism.
1 See also
- AristotleAristotle ( Greek Αριστοτλης Aristotelēs) ( 384 BCE March 7, 322 BCE) was a Greek scientist and philosopher. Along with Plato, he is often considered to be one of the two most influential philo
- Thomas AquinasSaint Thomas Aquinas ( 1225 March 7 1274) was a Catholic philosopher and theologian in the scholastic tradition, who gave birth to the thomistic school of philosophy, which was long the official dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. He is considered by the
- Immanuel KantImmanuel Kant ( April 22, 1724 February 12, 1804) was a Prussian philosopher, generally regarded as the last major philosopher of the Enlightenment, having a major impact on the Romantic and Idealist philosophies of the 19th century, and as one of history
- G. E. Moore
- J. L. MackieJohn Leslie Mackie ( 1917- 1981) was a philosopher, originally from Sydney, Australia. From 1967 until his death, he was a fellow of University College, Oxford. He was in 1974 elected a fellow of the British Academy. Interests and character Mackie was wel
Meta-ethicsIn philosophy, ethics is commonly divided into two branches, normative ethics and meta-ethics . Normative ethics addresses questions such as "What actions are good and bad?" and "What should we do?" Thus, a theory of normative ethics will endorse some eth
